Purpose: The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of independent directors in Vietnam about their roles and challenges when sitting on the boards of listed companies.
Introduction
Independent directors have long been considered as an important internal corporate governance mechanism, yet there is no universal definition of independent directors. The notion of "independent directors" is originally from the US after a giant corporate collapse -that of the Penn Central Transportation Company, in which the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) criticized the Penn Central board for lacking independence, failing to oversee operations, and not being able to identify the company's problems (Gordon, 2007) . Since then, independent directors have become more popular in corporate governance and have been central to regulatory reform after several corporate scandals. In the early 1990s, reform in the UK, based on the Cadbury Report released in 1992, has focused on the importance of the independent director. The Report recommends an enhanced function for independent directors as well as an increase in the number of independent directors on boards (Brooks et al., 2009 ).
Another example of reform relating to independent directors is the changes to the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations in Australia in 2010 in response to the collapse of the HIH (Le Mire and Gilligan, 2013) . These changes in corporate governance are expected to provide effective risk management devices that put more pressure on management to mitigate agency conflicts and unethical managerial behavior while maintaining a company's capacity for innovation. Thus, independent directors are considered to be fundamental to good corporate governance (Brooks et al., 2009 ).
However, the prior literature fails to establish a robust relationship between independent directors and improvement in firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Denis and McConnell, 2003) . Some authors claim that by lacking operational expertise and a basic understanding of the nature of the company's business, independent directors' contribution to the board and the firms' activities is limited since they may not know what is really going on in the company (Roberts et al., 2005 , Ringe, 2013 . Another possible reason is that independent directors do not fully recognize their duties/roles on the board because guidelines in the various codes are rather general, particularly in countries where corporate governance is weak (Kakabadse et al., 2010) . Therefore, an investigation into the perceptions of independent directors on a range of issues including the nature of the work performed and the challenges faced by them in current corporate governance systems is needed to understand the role of independent directors on boards as well as the monitoring mechanism over management used by them to mitigate agency conflicts in corporate governance.
Given the nature of research to explore the perceptions of independent directors, a study using qualitative methods is required to further our understanding of the role of board members in corporate governance. Prior literature shows that the majority of studies relating to corporate governance, particularly boards of directors, use empirical methods to investigate the role of the board and the relationship between board structure and firm outcomes, yet this method is identified as having various limitations when it comes to examining the role of the board of directors (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) . Examples are the endogeneity issue in corporate governance, heterogeneity in the governance solutions each firm opts for and the oversimplified models used which abstract away from many features of real, complex companies and their corporate governance (Adams et al., 2010) .
In the literature, only a few studies have used qualitative instruments to examine the perceptions of independent directors about their roles and challenges when participating on the board; examples are Hooghiemstra and Van Manen (2004) in the Netherlands and Brooks et al., (2009) in Australia. These studies have focused mainly on developed countries while there is a lack of similar studies in other groups of countries such as developing countries or transition economies. In transition economies, independent directors play an important role where corporate governance systems are at an early stage of development (Peng et al., 2003; Clarke, 2006) . A study in China by Kakabadse et al. (2010) shows that independent directors in transition economies are not as effective as they should be due to key differences in transition economies as compared with developed countries. The dominance of the state as a major controlling shareholder, the highly concentrated ownership structure as well as the lack of supporting institutions for governance mechanisms are a few key differences between these two group of countries (Peng et al., 2003 , Kakaladse et al., 2010 .
The notion of independent director originated in the US in the 1970s after the collapse of Penn Central, a major railway company. Then it spread to other countries including developed and developing countries and now transition economies (Ringe, 2013) . However, according to Pistor et al., (2003) , countries adopting foreign concepts frequently find various challenges to incorporate new concepts into their institutional settings. Therefore, an extension of the literature across transition economies will help us to understand the process of implementing "independent directors" in corporate governance, as well as to examine the role of and challenges for independent directors in transition economies.
One of the features of a transition economy is the movement from a centrally planned economy where the state has total control of companies to a free-market economy. This results in a highly concentrated ownership structure with the dominance of the state as the largest controlling shareholder which may complicate the work of independent directors. According to Ferrarini and Filippelli (2014) , the role and impact of independent directors in corporations with controlling shareholders are less frequently analyzed. Independent directors have a different and relatively narrower role to perform in controlled corporations and often play an even weaker role than economic theory would predict.
In this study, we aim to examine the perceptions of independent directors in listed companies in Vietnam via a mail survey to answer the research question: "How do independent directors recognize their roles and challenges in corporate governance, particularly under the presence of controlling shareholders in a transition economy?" One significant advantage of a survey is that it can help to obtain a depth of information from a wide population by collecting quantitative and specific data on the perceptions/beliefs of respondents (Brooks et al., 2009) . Mail surveys are also powerful, effective and efficient in terms of costs and administration and can be distributed to many targeted participants. A specific segment of the population (such as a sample of independent directors) can easily be reached via post mail (Scheuren, 2004) . So a survey-based approach allows us to ask very specific and qualitative questions to obtain high-quality information while maintaining the relatively large sample (Graham and Harvey, 2001 ).
Vietnam provides a unique context to answer the research question. Vietnam has a young corporate governance system that emerged after the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the early 1990s. Further, it has a high level of ownership concentration, in which the controlling shareholder can be either the state or private shareholders, 1 weak legal investor protection levels and the dominance of state ownership (World Bank, 2012 (Nguyen et al., 2017) . This demonstrates that independent directors on boards may not have sufficient "collective power" to influence boards' decisions and to execute their monitoring power. Because of these uncertainties, this research will examine how independent directors in Vietnam recognize their roles and challenges when undertaking a new role on the board. The findings will enable government and policy makers to identify the issues in current practice and propose necessary changes to the legislation. Further, the findings may help the government to develop a suitable framework, guidelines, and legislation to enhance the role of independent directors as an important internal control mechanism in corporate governance.
The first version of the Corporate Governance Codes for Listed Companies in Vietnam is released in 2007.
3 In Corporate Governance Codes 2012, except for independent directors who are introduced as a mandatory internal control mechanism for listed companies, other control measures such as board committees are optional. Additionally, if boards of directors decide to have a sub-committee, only human resources committee and remuneration committee are required to have at least one independent director to be the committee member.
The paper makes two contributions. The paper's first contribution is its exploration of the perceptions of independent directors in Vietnam from three perspectives -their role, their accessibility to information and the challenges in their work as an independent board member under the presence of controlling shareholders. Most of the previous similar studies on independent directors focus on developed countries such as the US or Australia where corporate governance and its supporting institutions are well developed (Brooks et al., 2009 ), but little is known about independent directors in countries with weak corporate governance and a lack of supporting institutions. Moreover, differences in economic development and business environment can also result in different perceptions of independent directors as well as different challenges for independent directors (Aguilera et al., 2008) . Second, it contributes to the literature on the relationship between independent directors and ownership concentration by pointing out how ownership concentration creates challenges for independent directors under conditions of weak corporate governance. Most of the previous studies focus on the quantitative measure of this relationship, but few have asked independent directors: "how does ownership concentration affect your role?"
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the roles of and challenges faced by independent directors when sitting on a board. Section 3 describes the data and research design, followed by the results and discussion in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes the conclusions and provides research implications.
Literature review
The following section reviews the literature to examine the roles of independent directors in theoretical and empirical studies as well as the challenges faced by independent directors that are examined by corporate governance research.
Roles of independent directors in corporate governance
On the board of directors, there are three types of directors that are commonly dealt with in the literature: inside directors (who are currently working in the company), grey directors (who are non-executive directors but have relationships with the company, management or blockholders) and independent directors (who are non-executive directors and have no such affiliations) (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) . Among board members, independent directors appear to play a prevalent role in improving the monitoring power of the board over management and to protect the shareholders' interests because of their independence from insiders, management, and the firm's business activities. As a result, companies with more independent directors are more likely to be in a better position to protect shareholders' interests (Bhagat and Black, 1999 ). In addition, Roberts et al. (2005) argue that independent directors can provide support for executives with their expertise, skills, and experience, apart from their monitoring function.
As an outsider, an independent director can challenge the executives, ask questions, engage in discussion and debate on the company's activities so that they contribute to enhancing management performance and, by that means, improving firm performance.
However, the roles and duties of independent directors in the literature are still somewhat unclear. Do independent directors have the same duties and tasks as other board members or do they have some extra duties on the board? Are they effective in their monitoring activities?
The literature on the role of independent directors in corporate governance has been developed under two streams, quantitative studies and qualitative studies. The former stream focuses on examining how differences in board structure affect the company's outcomes and performance.
In contrast, the latter stream uses qualitative methods like surveys or interviews to explore the question: "What do independent directors do"? It is worth noting that qualitative studies on the role of independent directors are rather limited while the more extensive quantitative studies use archival and secondary data (Adams et al., 2010) .
With regard to the quantitative empirical literature, the purpose of this type of research is to examine if particular functions/roles of independent directors contribute to improving corporate outcomes and performance. A large body of literature focuses on the monitoring role of independent directors over management (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1999; Bolton, 2008, Faleye et al., 2011) and over firms' activities (Brickley et al., 1994; Cotter et al., 1997) . Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Faleye et al. (2011) both find that when the board is independent, CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance. However, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) argue that independent directors can be good at evaluating CEO performance, but if independent directors' lack detailed knowledge about the firm's business, they may not be effective in contributing to the process of hiring new CEOs for the company. In relation to the monitoring of independent directors over firms' activities, Cotter et al. (1997) , when considering the monitoring role of independent directors in tender offers in the US, find that if the target firm's board is independent, the target shareholder gains over the tender offer period are higher than in target firms without majority-independent boards. Similarly, Brickley et al. (1994) report that US firms with majority-independent boards experience a more significantly positive stock market reaction to the adoption of a poison pills defence in a takeover, as compared with firms without such boards.
Concerning the monitoring function of independent directors, an increasing literature has focused on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the role of independent directors and the board of directors in satisfying the interests of all stakeholders in the company (Ayuso and Argandona, 2009) . Under stakeholder theory, corporate governance is a system that forces management to internalize the welfare of not only shareholders but also stakeholders (Tirole, 2010) , in other words, affirming the company purpose of "maximizing the sum of various stakeholders' surpluses" (Tirole, 2010, p.58) . In that meaning, the responsibilities of independent directors toward CSR policies and activities are considered as a contribution to the interests of stakeholders (Freeman and Velamuri, 2006) . Therefore, the monitoring by independent directors of CSR becomes more important as a part of their monitoring function.
Recent literature on corporate governance has emphasized the other role of independent directors besides the monitoring role -that is the advisory role. The advisory role is "a more traditional job of forming strategy [that] requires close collaboration" (The Economist, February 2001; p.68). Adams and Ferreira (2007) suggest that both monitoring and advisory roles contribute mainly to improve firm performance but in an advisory role, board members need to take a more hands-off approach in which they must use their expertise and experience to counsel management on firms' strategic decisions. In addition, according to Faleye et al. (2013) , to be effective in an advisory role, directors need to build a trust relationship with the CEO to facilitate the exchange of information and ideas between them. Directors who undertake advisory roles should undertake minimal monitoring activities over management to be able to win the trust of the CEO so that they can get access to relevant strategic information (Adams, 2009 ).
However, the above literature mostly uses empirical methods to examine the effectiveness of individual monitoring activities by means of archival data. In that respect, it lacks a comprehensive view of monitoring activities.
Few studies, such as Hoghiemstra and Van Manen (2003) and Brooks et al. (2009) , use qualitative methods to examine how independent directors understand their roles on the board.
Both studies find that independent directors have emphasized their monitoring role while they are still aware of their advisory role. However, this research is in developed countries (Netherland and Australia) where corporate governance systems are highly developed. In the case of transition economies where corporate governance systems are still young and underdeveloped, it is unclear how independent directors recognize their roles on the board. A similar qualitative study focusing on a transition economy will provide a comprehensive analysis to further our understanding of independent directors in corporate governance across different countries.
Challenges faced by independent directors
To be qualified as independent, a director needs to satisfy all legal requirements as stated in the corporate governance codes. However, to be effective in his/her work, that director needs to overcome various challenges in corporate governance as well as the business environment.
Two common challenges are the information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders and the prevalence of controlling shareholders on the board.
Information asymmetries
Information asymmetries between the executive and non-executive directors are a significant issue for independent directors. Information is essential for independent directors to communicate with insiders and to make appropriate decisions in exercising their duties.
Theoretically, in a company where information accessibility is open and information disclosure is at a high level, the effectiveness of independent directors will be higher (Aguilera et al., 2008) . Independent directors are considered as part-time officers in the company and they only attend board meetings. Thus, it is difficult for them to get access to company information if information asymmetries between executive directors and independent directors exist (Maassen, 1999) . In that situation, independent directors possibly need to rely on publicly available information if they deem that insufficient information is provided to them.
Empirically, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) find a positive relationship between information disclosure and independent directors, which implies that when the board has more independent directors (i.e. more monitoring power), more information is made available to them and more information disclosure also contributes to the greater effectiveness of independent directors.
The surveys by Hooghiemstra and Van Manen (2004) point out the concerns from independent directors about their ability to fulfill the role of independent director due to the "independence paradox" (p.314), in which independent directors have to rely on the information provided by management and executive directors while they are expected by regulators and investors to be independent of managers. Stiles and Taylor (2001) also find that because of limited access to information and limited time to devote to being a board member, the board basically acts in a "gatekeeper role" (p.43). Similarly, in Brooks et al.'s (2009) study, independent directors propose that they need more information to support their responsibilities and duties on the board. In particular, they require more "future-oriented" information and fewer historical financial reports, which, by definition, focus on details about past events. It can be seen that information accessibility is crucial for independent directors to execute their roles as a board
member, yet the existence of information asymmetries can create challenges to these directors.
Ownership concentration
In companies with controlling shareholders, the prevalent agency conflict that independent directors need to deal with is not the conflict between owners and managers but the conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008) . The dominance of controlling shareholders can be a serious challenge to independent directors because the former can use their prevalent voting power to influence management as well as other board members to make decisions contrary to the independent directors (Dahya et al., 2008) . The other possibility is that controlling shareholders can collude with independent directors to exploit the benefit of minority shareholders (Jiang and Peng, 2011) . In that case, independent directors are not capable of taking up their roles, responsibilities, and tasks, and can become ineffective on the board.
Empirical evidence on the effect of controlling shareholders on independent directors is inconclusive. Some studies find a negative influence of controlling shareholders on independent directors (Claessen and Fan, 2002; Dahya et al., 2008; Fan et al., 2011) while other studies find a positive influence or no impact on controlling shareholders (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Liu et al., 2015) . Research in transition economies on the impact of controlling shareholders on independent directors is also mixed. In China, Liu et al. (2015) find a positive influence of controlling shareholders on the relationship between independent directors and firm performance while Nguyen et al. (2017) report an opposite impact of controlling shareholders on independent directors in Vietnam. The next question that will be of interest to academia and practitioners is how controlling shareholders influence independent directors on boards.
Little is known about mechanisms that controlling shareholders use to influence independent directors. Is it the effect of the collusion between the two or is it because controlling shareholders use their power on the board to disable the independent directors? Few studies look at this issue. Kakabadse et al. (2010) interview 21 independent directors from listed companies in China, and find that independent directors tend to depend on the person or group who appoints them and in many cases this is the controlling shareholder. By having this on their minds, independent directors become ineffective in monitoring and exercising control over management and also controlling shareholders because they fear being replaced if they challenge either managers or other board members. In addition, controlling shareholders also play a role in recruitment that may lead to the selection of independent directors becoming ineffective. Nevertheless, Kakabadse et al. (2010) also acknowledge that their findings have limitations because of the small sample size used in their study.
A similar study in another transition economy and another context of course, may come up with another finding about the influence of controlling shareholders on the roles that independent directors exercise. As transition economies become more diverse after their transition process (Grosman et al., 2016) , corporate governance systems and their associated mechanisms including independent directors may work differently due to differences in political, legal and economic systems as well as the difference in the level of economic development. Apart from these macro-differences, state ownership and government efficiency may differ and may lead to differences in the influence of the state as a controlling shareholder on corporate governance and, in particular, on independent directors. Therefore, this study of the perceptions of independent directors about their roles and challenges under the presence of a controlling shareholder in Vietnam will extend our understanding of the development of corporate governance and how independent directors can contribute to improving governance in a country with a very young corporate governance system. In summary, the study aims to provide an answer to the research question "How do independent directors recognize their roles and challenges in corporate governance in the presence of controlling shareholders in a transition economy?"
Research design
This study uses a qualitative research method to collect information on the perceptions of independent directors about their roles and challenges on their boards. The data is obtained directly from the participants via a research survey instrument. As our objective is to gather as many opinions of independent directors as possible, we choose a mail survey as the most appropriate data collection method.
However, there are issues with using mail surveys such as procuring an accurate list of people in the population from which to draw the sample. In our study, since there is no database for collecting information about independent directors in Vietnam, we need to manually collect personal information (names and addresses) of independent directors of listed companies in with a follow-up mail out after two months. We received 190 responses in total, and after the manipulation check, a total of 170 usable responses remained, representing a response rate of 21%. According to Holbrook et al. (2007) , this response rate is reasonable and acceptable given the difficulties of obtaining responses from a mailed survey. Moreover, Visser et al. (1996) find that surveys with lower response rates (around 20%) yield more accurate and reliable measurements than surveys with higher response rate (50% or more).
Results and discussion

Personal profile of respondents
The personal profile of respondents to the survey provides information about their age, expertise and experience as independent directors (Table 1 ). The majority of respondents are in their 30s (48%), 22% of respondents are in their 40s, while the proportions of respondents under 30 and over 50 are almost the same (15%). This shows that independent directors participating in the survey are relatively young.
[Insert Table 1 here]
With regard to their experience as independent directors, since independent directors are introduced in the Corporate Governance Codes 2012, most of the respondents have less than five years' experience in that capacity and may have been recruited to fulfill the requirements of the new code. In fact, 34% of participants tell that they have more than three years' experience sitting on the board of a company where 66% of respondents report less than three years. In addition, the majority of respondents do not have multi-directorships with about 92% of respondents sitting on only one board and 8% saying that they sit on more than one.
Concerning the expertise of independent directors, 41% of respondents specialize in accounting whereas 16% of them have law expertise. Moreover, 24% of respondents work in the nonmanufacturing area and 20% work in manufacturing industries. The majority of respondents have a bachelor's degree (69%) while 27% hold a master's degree and 4% even hold a Ph.D.
The youth of the participants in the survey reflects the fact that independent directors are a new and recent addition to corporate governance mechanisms in Vietnam and most of the independent directors lack experience in undertaking this new role.
Roles of independent directors
As suggested by the literature, independent directors have two major functions on the boardthe monitoring function and the advisory function. Each function requires independent directors to take different responsibilities and to make different contributions. To understand the role of independent directors on the boards of Vietnamese listed companies, we ask questions to explore the responsibilities, contributions, and interaction among board members.
Key responsibilities of independent directors
In part 5 of the survey (Appendix 1), we ask questions to understand the perceptions of independent directors of their responsibilities. Key responsibilities of independent directors are outlined in studies by Hooghiemstra and Van Manen (2004) and Brooks et al. (2009) and fall into two different groups: the monitoring responsibilities and advisory responsibilities. Table   1 reports the results of the recognition of independent directors' responsibilities. It is noted that
Vietnam corporate governance codes contain no guidelines about the responsibilities of independent directors so the responses in the survey may be the result of self-recognition of directors from their own practice.
As shown in Table 2 , it appears that independent directors place emphasis on advisory roles with the highest level of agreement being (1) Contribute to the development of corporate strategy (4.471), (2) Identify issues that require more management attention for future improvement (4.335) and (3) Ensure strategic corporate decisions are reached through sound processes (4.329). In the literature, Hooghiemstra and Van Manen, (2004) and Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) suggest the "strategic advisor" role of independent directors. In this study, the results provide further evidence about the significance of this role of independent directors in a transition economy. However, the prior literature also notes that to be able to take up the role as "strategic advisor", independent directors need "the freedom and confidence to think independently and widely beyond the functional limits of managerial disciplines" (Garratt, 2005, p.31) along with the ability to obtain access to reliable information and to build up a trust relationship with executive members of management (Faleye et al., 2013) . Thus, independent directors should be aware of these challenges when undertaking an advising role on a board. It is also surprising that in Vietnam the monitoring function of independent directors has been rated lower than the advisory function.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Responsibilities associated with the monitoring role are rated lower. In particular, several monitoring responsibilities have quite low scores; such as (1) Scrutinize management performance (4.324), (2) Provide an independent check on corporate control (4.065) and (3) Ensure robust risk management is in place (4.059). Interestingly, independent directors consider the monitoring of senior executive remuneration (3.647) far less important as compared to other responsibilities. In addition, we ask about the monitoring of independent directors over a company's CSR, which is associated with the interests of other stakeholders.
We find that independent directors seem to disagree that monitoring CSR is one of their key responsibilities (two responsibilities relating to CSR are ranked lowest as shown in Table 2 ).
The results of the survey demonstrate that independent directors rate their monitoring responsibility toward shareholders higher than towards other stakeholders although they seem to be less agreed about the importance of monitoring responsibilities.
This preference of independent directors for an advisory role is not consistent with the prior literature on independent directors which considers that the primary responsibility of directors is to monitor management (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Faleye et al., 2011) . However, it may reflect the unique circumstances of many transition economies (Cheung et al., 2008; Kakabadse et al., 2010) . The reason may be that in transition economies where there are numerous obstacles for independent directors to execute their monitoring roles (such as concentrated ownership structure, the dominance of the state, weak legal investor protections and lack of experience and capability, etc.), the monitoring function of independent directors is undermined (Cheung et al., 2008) . In that situation, independent directors may prefer to undertake an advisory role to avoid possible conflicts arising between them and management and controlling shareholders. Referring to the Vietnam situation, ownership concentration is common in listed companies with the dominance of the state while corporate governance institutions are weak or non-existent (Vo and Nguyen, 2014, Nguyen et al., 2017) . Although the new corporate governance codes require listed companies to have more than 30% of board members as independent directors, in practice, many companies fail to do so (Nguyen et al., 2017) . As a result, independent directors may not have sufficient power and they may prefer to put less emphasis on the monitoring role in order to avoid conflict with other board members
and management.
We further analyze the data to examine if the perception of independent directors with regard to responsibilities relating to monitoring and advisory functions differs across independent directors with different expertise and different degrees of experience on the board. According to Guner et al. (2008) and Wang et al. (2015) , independent directors with different expertise may have a different level of effectiveness in the monitoring function. In effect, independent directors with industry expertise are more likely to have a better ability to oversee management (Wang et al., 2015) whereas independent directors with accounting and financial expertise may focus more on finance and investment decisions (which is related to the advisory function) but not monitoring (for example: over executive compensation) (Guner et al., 2008) . In this study, we ask independent directors with different expertise about their perceptions of different responsibilities relating to monitoring and advisory functions. The results are presented in Table 3 .
[Insert Table 3 Further, no training is provided to independent directors when they participate on the board.
As a result, independent directors with law backgrounds may have the skills to achieve a basic understanding of the roles of independent directors in corporate governance legislation. On the other hand, independent directors with manufacturing or non-manufacturing backgrounds may not have access to such sources of information. Thus, they might not know what they should do on the board. This result highlights the need for either guidelines in corporate governance codes for independent directors about their roles or a training course for individuals who have been newly appointed to be independent directors.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The second factor that may affect the perceptions of independent directors about their role is their experience on the board. In our sample, 66% of independent directors have less than three years of experience sitting on a corporate board while 34% of them have more than three years.
Generally, the result demonstrates that independent directors with more experience on the board have a significantly higher level of agreement on responsibilities relating monitoring function (as shown in Table 4 ) while the level of agreement on advisory function is more likely to be the same between two groups of independent directors. This means that more experienced directors establish a better understanding of what they should do on a board in monitoring activities. This result is consistent with prior studies, which suggest that independent directors with more experience exhibit better monitoring and advisory capacities (Ferris et al., 2003; Kroll et al., 2008) . This may suggest that in the near future when independent directors can accumulate their experience on the board, they may become more aware of what they should do on the board.
Involvement of independent directors in board activities
To consider the contribution of independent directors to the company, we attempt to explore the areas over which independent directors perceive they have power and their level of contribution in different activities.
[Insert Table 5 here]
As shown in Table 5 , 82% of independent directors believe they have the power to influence company strategy which is consistent with the recognition of the most significant responsibility as a strategic advisor, as discussed in the previous section. Independent directors recognize that they have the key responsibility of contributing to corporate strategy, and they believe they have power over this area.
Further, Table 5 demonstrates that only 25% of independent directors indicate that they have the power to change professional advisors for the company and 30% believe that they can control executives' compensation. The low capacity of power to monitor executive compensation along with the unwillingness of independent directors to consider the responsibility to set up executive compensation as a key responsibility, as shown in Table 2 , reveal that independent directors in Vietnam tend to avoid monitoring executive compensation.
One possible reason is that in transition economies where there is ownership concentration with the dominance of the state, companies tend to have powerful CEOs who have strong ties to controlling shareholders (Lin, 2001) . Thus, independent directors may aim to avoid creating conflicts with executives in monitoring remuneration. In our sample, respondents reveal that 56.47% of their CEOs are representatives of controlling shareholders (See Table 7 ). When comparing the responses of participants whose company has a representative of controlling shareholders as the CEO and the responses of participants whose company has a CEO without any relationship to controlling shareholders, the results show that independent directors in the former group rated the responsibility to set executive compensation relatively lower than the latter group (3.56 against 3.71). 5 The other possible reason is that, in firms with ownership concentration, controlling shareholders have a strong influence on setting executive pay (Kato and Long, 2006) and, hence, less powerful independent directors might be reluctant to execute their monitoring capabilities over executive compensation.
Concerning the involvement of independent directors in different activities, as shown in Table   6 , the highest-rated contribution is to protect shareholders'/investors' interests (4.111), which is theoretically the main duty of the board of directors. We also ask if independent directors contribute to protecting the interests of controlling shareholders. However, most respondents agree that protecting the interest of controlling shareholders is an activity to which they make a relatively minor contribution (3.018). Hence, it can be concluded that independent directors aim to place emphasis on protecting the interests of general/minority shareholders to mitigate the conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders and between management and shareholders. Further, in this study, it is implied that independent directors protect the interests of shareholders via their advisory role.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Respondents also place in the highest category their contribution to developing company strategies (4.041) and to providing new ideas/insights (3.982). This, again, confirms the preference of independent directors for undertaking an advisory role on a board while it seems that they are less willing to take a monitoring role. The rating of their contribution to improving management's monitoring function was among the lowest score at 3.553. elements that people tend to avoid conflicts with their business partners (Vuong et al., 2013) .
This finding may explain why independent directors prefer to execute their advisory function over their monitoring function on their boards.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Concerning the impact of a controlling shareholder on independent directors, we ask if independent directors are nominated by controlling shareholders or minority shareholders. As shown in Table 7 , 60.59% of independent directors reveal that they are nominated by controlling shareholders to participate in the board, and 18.82% of respondents are nominated by minority shareholders with a close relationship with controlling shareholders (for example banks or other financial institutions). However, 20.59% of independent directors are nominated by minority shareholders without any relationship with a controlling shareholder. In summary, about 79% of independent directors participate on the board under the influence of controlling shareholders. As Kakabadse et al. (2010) suggest, once an independent director is nominated and voted for by the controlling shareholder, it is less likely that he/she will vote against the controlling shareholder because that independent director needs the former's voting power to stay on the board.
Information asymmetries
Information is essential for independent directors to undertake their roles regardless of whether they are monitoring or advising. Independent directors are outsiders, and they have limited access to information. Only when the CEO or insiders are willing to share information with them, they can undertake their roles effectively (Stiles and Taylor, 2001 ). Hooghiemstra and Van Manen (2004) propose the "independence paradox" in which independent directors need to monitor management independently, but have to rely on the information provided by them.
In this survey, we also find a similar challenge for independent directors when they participate on the board.
When being asked about the barriers that independent directors face when sitting on the board, the two issues rated the highest are (1) Lack of information for informed decision-making Concerning the amount of information received, as revealed in Table 8 , none of the respondents believes that too much information is provided to them while 83% of them say that they received sufficient information and only 17% responded that they received too little. Regarding the validity of that information, surprisingly, about 23% of respondents tell that they could not check the validity of the information, which indicates a serious problem. While we assume that information is essential to independent directors to fulfill their monitoring and advisory roles, the invalidity of information may lead to inappropriate decisions being made, thus adversely affecting firm performance (Nowak and McCabe, 2003) .
[Insert Table 8 here] recognize published financial reports and formal board meetings as the most important source of information. Although independent directors reveal that they receive sufficient information, they also claim that the information they receive contains too much emphasis on historically detailed financial information (78.24% of respondents) while they are looking to receive more forecast information (65.14%) and strategic information (52.54%) (See Table 9 ). This indicates that to make their own decisions they need to rely on either the information publicly provided to other shareholders and public users or the information intentionally provided by the CEO and executive directors. Having said that, the independence paradox also exists in Vietnam as executive directors are still the most important sources of information. This problem is considered a global issue and overcoming the independence paradox is still under consideration with regard to changing the regulatory environment (Brooks et al., 2009) .
[Insert Table 9 here]
Other challenges for independent directors in Vietnam
When being asked about the barriers for independent directors in Vietnam, as shown in Table   10 , 30% of respondents strongly agree that the lack of detailed guidelines on duties/responsibilities of independent directors in the Corporate Governance Codes for Listed
Companies is one of the key barriers for them when participating in a board (rated 4.159). This means there is a lack of legal support to back up the independent directors, and they undertake their roles based on their self-recognition of the concept of "independent directors" borrowed from other countries. This issue is specific to Vietnam because, in many countries, the introduction of independent directors is commonly accompanied by detailed guidelines on responsibilities/duties. For example, the responsibilities of independent directors have been [Insert Table 10 here]
The other issues highlighted in the survey are the lack of knowledge/understanding of the company (3.906) and lack of involvement in the company (3.876). From the perspective of independent directors, this expresses concerns that independent directors may not have sufficient time, and thus make sufficient effort, to be fully engaged and involved in a company's activities. This is in line with Roberts et al. (2005) who suggest that a good understanding of the nature of the company would increase the contribution and accountability of independent directors in a company. Personal issues (such as personal faults or lack of ability) are also counted as barriers for independent directors on the board, and this problem is rated relatively important as compared with other issues (3.812). The next challenges are a lack of support from the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) to help independent directors to understand their roles on the board (3.642), a lack of fresh ideas to contribute to the board (3.618) and a lack of commitment by independent directors in the companies (3.612).
Conclusion
This In addition, independent directors in Vietnam tend to choose to undertake an advisory role on the board. However, they are facing several difficulties. The first one is information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders -the independence paradox. This is not an unexpected problem as it has been found in many developed and developing countries (e.g., Nowak and McCabe, 2003; Hooghiemstra and Van Manen, 2004, Brooks et al., 2009 ). Our findings indicate that information is also an issue in transition economies. More attention from regulators is needed to create a more transparent environment for all parties to obtain access to relevant information. Additionally, in this survey, independent directors claim that CEOs intentionally hold back information and that they need to rely mostly on public information and information from the formal board meeting. That prevents independent directors from having sufficient information to understand the nature of decisions to be made. To be more effective, independent directors look forward to receiving more future forecast and strategic information while receiving less published financial information.
The second challenge is the concentrated ownership commonly found in developing and transition economies. The literature suggests that controlling shareholders can adversely influence the effectiveness of independent directors. Our study points out several mechanisms by which controlling shareholders can affect independent directors in Vietnam. First, most respondents agree that controlling shareholders can disable the power of independent directors on the board by exerting control over the CEO, the chair or the majority of board members.
Second, most respondents believe that the existence of controlling shareholders and their power limit the monitoring capacity of independent directors as directors need the voting power of controlling shareholders to be board members and it is not usual for them to be entirely independent of those who appoint them.
In conclusion, this study formulates some insights into the perceptions of independent directors about their roles and the challenges faced by them and suggests several implications for both regulators and practitioners in Vietnam. Appropriate steps should be taken to encourage the engagement of independent directors and to limit the challenges for them on boards. First, by accelerating the privatization process, state ownership concentration can be reduced while legal investor protection can be strengthened. In doing so, the ownership structure in firms with the state as a controlling shareholder will be dispersed, leaving independent directors with more power on the board through receiving more voting power from minority shareholders.
Additionally, minority shareholders will be protected legally, thus they will have more power to support independent directors on boards. Second, the result also highlights the need for guidelines in corporate governance codes and for training for independent directors so that they can understand what they should do when sitting on a corporate board. Finally, information disclosure and transparency is an issue for independent directors that prevents them from being effective in their decision-making. Regulators and the Security Exchange Commission in
Vietnam should take specific actions in relation to policies that enhance information disclosure and transparency, such as requiring more mandatory information disclosure and increasing the penalty for information fraud. 
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